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Why Peacebuilders Fail to 
Secure Ownership and be 
Sensitive to Context 

Executive Summary 
The policies of the UN, the World Bank, OECD-DAC and most bilat-
eral donors have converged around a liberal peacebuilding model, 
where rule of law, market economy and democracy are seen as central 
to build a lasting peace. There are also procedural principles that are 
included in this consensus that stipulates how to proceed to build lib-
eral democracies. The first principle is that external actors need to re-
spect and secure local ownership. The second is that that external ac-
tors need, wherever and whenever possible, to build on existing insti-
tutions and thus to take local context as their point of departure. While 
the substantive elements of peacebuilding (i.e. democracy, rule of law, 
market economy) clearly define peacebuilding practice, the two pro-
cedural principles – ownership and context – are often neglected or 
marginalized. Extant research strongly suggests that this lack of atten-
tion to ownership and context go a long way in explaining why so 
many peacebuilding efforts are judged to be ineffective and unsustain-
able over time. This report seeks to understand why these two proce-
dural principles are recognized as important yet seem to be of little 
import in shaping peacebuilding efforts. I offer an explanation that 
locates the problem in two key assumptions that are fundamental to 
how peacebuilding efforts are organized. The first assumption is that 
knowledge about universal features and mechanisms of the liberal 
peacebuilding is more important than geographically specific knowl-
edge of the post-conflict country in question. The second assumption 
is that the international legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts automati-
cally translates into domestic legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts in 
post-conflict countries. I show that these two assumptions lead peace-
builders to be both “blind” and “arrogant”. They are “blind” to local 
factors that are central to effective peacebuilding because their frame 
of reference is mainly drawn from universal templates for how to 
build peace which draws heavily on western experience, expertise and 
institutions. And they are “arrogant” as they believe that lack of do-
mestic legitimacy is caused by misperceptions which can be addressed 
through quick impact projects and ad-hoc measures. The prevalence of 
these assumptions helps explain why respect for ownership and sensi-
tivity to local context is preached but not practiced. The problem, 
then, is built into the widely shared yet mostly unrecognized assump-
tions and the attendant organizational forms and practices that define 
what peacebuilding is about.  

Introduction: professionalizing post-
conflict peacebuilding 
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been engaged in close to 
twenty so-called complex peace operations. These operations include 
not only peacekeeping, but extends to de facto state building opera-
tions where the UN is to help organize democratic elections, establish 
the rule of law and help design and implement social and economic 
reforms. To meet this expansion of tasks, there has been considerable 
effort – both inside and outside the UN – to formulate new strategies, 
policy positions and best practices. Within the UN’s Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), and the Development Programme (UNDP) new policies have 
been established that seek to address the central problems facing so-
called “failed states”. New institutional entities have been established, 
such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support 
Office, and new, cross-organizational mechanisms - such as integrated 
missions – are being developed.  Moreover, new doctrines and guide-
lines for field staff has emerged that seeks to capture lessons learned 
from these more ambitious and comprehensive operations, as evi-
denced by the recent publication of DPKO’s Capstone Doctrine.  
 
Concomitant with the professionalization and institutionalization of 
peacebuilding within the UN and other international organizations 
there has been a rapidly expanding literature on the effectiveness and 
character of peace- and statebuilding. Some studies show that impor-
tant progress has been made over the course of the last decade or so. 
The Human Security Report from 2007 concludes that “Between 1999 
and 2006 … The number of armed conflicts being fought in [sub-
Saharan Africa] fell by more than half. The number of people being 
killed dropped even more steeply—by 2006 the annual battle-death 
toll was just 2 percent of that of 1999.” (p. 5). At the same time, how-
ever, studies focused more specifically on the effectiveness of efforts 
to prevent and stop violent conflicts by the UN and other actors paint 
a less positive picture. These studies find that the failure to build a 
sustainable peace range from 30 % of countries relapsing into conflict 
within two years (Doyle and Sambanis 2006) to 44% within five years 
(Mack 2007). These findings give rise to questions about the viability 
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and relative efficacy of externally driven efforts to build a lasting 
peace. At minimum, these findings suggest that we should be con-
cerned with ways to make peacebuilding more sustainable. This report 
is an attempt to do so.  
 
The explanations for why the UN – and others – so often fail in build-
ing a sustainable peace range from lack of resources and long-term 
commitment (i.e. lack of “political will”) to lack of or poor strategies 
of how to build peace (i.e. what peacebuilding should be about).1 
Here, however, I focus primarily on one finding that seems to cut 
across the research on the topic, which concerns how external actors 
go about formulating peacebuilding strategies and implementing them 
in practice. Specifically, a central factor accounting for the lack of 
sustainability over time of peacebuilding efforts is arguably the inabil-
ity of peacebuilders to secure and respect local ownership and to build 
domestic, bottom-up legitimacy for the reforms that liberal peace-
building entails (Chandler 2006; Suhrke 2007; Richmond 2007; Paris 
and Sisk 2008). This conclusion conforms to research on the literature 
on ownership in development studies more generally, where a key les-
son is that lack of support for political and institutional reforms from 
key local groups reduces the effectiveness of external actors’ efforts to 
help generate institutional and political change. In their discussion of 
aid effectiveness, for example, Collier and Dollar note that “Meaning-
ful, sustained policy reform requires commitment and ‘ownership’ 
from the governments in question and some degree of acceptance by 
the wider society.” (2004: 255).  
 
Indeed, the importance of securing local ownership for peacebuilding 
efforts have since long been recognized as among the central princi-
ples by policy makers, as evidenced by key policy documents on 
peacebuilding from the UN, the World Bank and the OECD-DAC. 
But if ownership is recognized as being critical to long-term success 
of peacebuilding efforts, and this has been established policy for quite 
some time, then why do external actors so often fail in implementing 
in practice? Why, in short, does the UN (and other multilateral and 
bilateral actors) not live by and implement the two procedural princi-
ples of securing ownership and being sensitive to local context? I lo-
cate the answer in two assumptions that pervade peacebuilding efforts 
that are rarely discussed and reflected upon. The first assumption con-
cerns the privileging of universal over local knowledge. The second 
assumption concerns the privileging of international over domestic 
sources of legitimacy. I discuss each assumption in turn, arguing that 
they both follow from a particular “Archimedean” interpretation of the 
                                                 
1 Evidently, local actors’ interests, strategies and power rivals that of external actors in 
determining whether a sustainable peace will emerge over time. The report deliberately 
sidesteps this issue, however, as it is concerned with the more limited question of how to 
maximize external actors positive contribution to such a sustainable peace.  
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liberal principles that define the content of the liberal peacebuilding 
model (Bhuta 2008). In this Archimedean interpretation of the liberal 
peacebuilding model, its constituting substantive elements (free mar-
kets, rule of law in keeping with human rights, democratic elections) 
are seen to be non-negotiable principles that, in a sense, stand outside 
history and above politics. As such, they do not form part of the on-
going debates about and reflection on what peacebuilding is and 
should be about. Because these are seen as “principles true in every 
country” (Mitchell 2002), there is little room for compromise, adapta-
tion and context-specific approaches. As a consequence, knowledge 
about country-specific issues thus always takes the back-seat to uni-
versal knowledge about what the liberal peacebuilding model entails, 
and international sources of legitimacy – in the form of conformity to 
international norms about the liberal goals of peacebuilding – of the 
state that is to be built takes precedence over domestically generated 
legitimacy. 
 

Universal knowledge trumps country-
specific knowledge 
A common criticism of peacebuilding efforts is that they exhibit a 
“one-size fits all” approach. Referring to the inclination to adopt 
cookie-cutter solutions, Call and Cousens have noted, for example, 
that “peacebuilding programs … prefer technical solutions over cul-
turally specific approaches” and “assume that international standards 
will always be applicable.” (2007: 14). This is, indeed, recognized as a 
central challenge at the level of peacebuilding policy, as evidenced by 
OECD-DAC’s “Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States and Situations” (OECD-DAC 2007). This feature of 
peacebuilding is in part explained by the fact that international organi-
zations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are bureaucratic organi-
zations that operate through standardized templates. They thus flatten 
diversity, operating as if the challenges of peacebuilding are the more 
or less the same in very different countries (Barnett 2006; Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004). But the issue is not only that bureaucratic organiza-
tions favour universal templates and in that sense privileges the uni-
versal over the context-specific. The drive for standardization is, after 
all, a ubiquitous feature of modern organizations, not a particular fea-
ture of international organizations involved in peacebuilding. To fully 
understand how the universal trumps the local in peacebuilding ef-
forts, therefore, we need to look more closely at the substantive con-
tents and organization of peacebuilding efforts.  
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era where there were fewer 
constraints on the expansion of more explicitly liberal principles as the 
foundation for the ever more complex post-conflict efforts undertaken 
by the UN. The UN Security Council thus referred to “democracy” in 
53 resolutions between 1993 and 2000. The UN Secretary General has 
summarized what is arguably common wisdom within the UN with 
regards to peacebuilding in saying that the role of the UN is to “help 
countries emerging from conflict build democratic institutions and en-
trench democratic norms. Today, the UN’s efforts to promote democ-
racy are inseparable from our broader work for security, development 
and human rights.”2 By making post-conflict peacebuilding synony-
mous with the advancement of liberal democratic principles, peace-
building has become defined as a project that entails a comprehensive 
                                                 
2 UNSG, April 10th, 2007. Speech at the UN Democracy Fund on UN Peace Day. See: 
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XNewsPeaceDay.htm 
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set of interventions aimed at re-building not only state institutions, but 
the very organization of state-society relations.   
Against this background, the authority of external actors in a post-
conflict setting is not only derived from their humanitarian mandate, 
or the legal mandate from the UN Charter, or from the resources that 
are marshalled to help re-build a country following a conflict. It also 
stems in no small part from how peacebuilders claim to know what 
needs to be done to prevent future conflicts, and to help build a liberal 
democratic state. Because all peacebuilding efforts are modelled on 
and seek to advance goals associated with liberal principles, that 
knowledge is tied to expertise and experience in what these liberal 
principles are, how they should be made operational and how they 
should be implemented in a post-conflict setting. Very schematically, 
we may say that the substantive content of peacebuilding is defined 
“top-down” (deductively) from a set of liberal principles stipulating 
how (ideal) societies should be organized and governed, and not “bot-
tom-up” (inductively), where knowledge about what works is gener-
ated from concrete experience.  
To say that the content of peacebuilding and the knowledge deemed 
most important in operationalizing and implementing it is determined 
“top-down” is to suggest that the principles that defines peacebuilding 
are non-negotiable and given. These liberal principles are given from 
an “Archimedean” position where the means and ends of peacebuild-
ing are seen as a-historical and pre-political. In defining peacebuilding 
as being about efforts to implement what are essentially non-
negotiable principles about democratic rule, human rights, liberal eco-
nomic policy, rule of law etc, peacebuilders’ technical competence in 
and knowledge about the functionally specific tasks of how to reform 
the judicial sector, or the security sector, or the economy invariably 
takes precedence over local and context specific knowledge. 
This feature of peacebuilding helps account for how it is that peace-
building professionals with functionally specific expertise in a particu-
lar issue-area (security sector reform, rule of law, human rights, gen-
der, etc) assume a position of authority in knowing what needs to be 
done in countries they often know little about. One becomes an “ex-
pert” by virtue of knowing about a functionally specific area, not by 
knowing about a particular country. This is exacerbated by a number 
of institutional constraints within the UN. For one, UN member states 
have put limits both on what the UN can do to gather “intelligence” on 
countries, and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) – the institu-
tional home for country-specific knowledge in the UN system – is 
small and poorly equipped to track developments in different coun-
tries (Call and Cousens 2007). This is exacerbated by the fact that UN 
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missions at the country level only to a very limited degree hire and 
make effective use of national and local staff that really knows the 
country. Not only are they paid less, they can rarely advance to posi-
tions concomitant with their experience and expertise of the country in 
question compared to expats with expertise in a functionally defined 
issue-area.3  
 
Such privileging of universal knowledge – of institutional forms, 
mechanisms, governing tasks etc – helps explain how and why peace-
builders, despite the best of intentions, quite simply do not have an 
appropriate understanding of the central problems and challenges they 
are facing. In an extensive study of MONUC, Autesserre (2008) re-
ports how the UN and other donors defined the country as post-
conflict despite clear indications to the contrary. Local conflicts per-
sisted, causing deaths and displacement on a large scale, yet the UN 
continued to insist that these local conflicts were insignificant. What 
mattered, the UN held, was to address the problems at the national and 
regional level. Her description of the professional background and be-
haviour of MONUC staff in Kinshasa captures how the tendency to 
rely on universal templates is produced and reproduced:  
 
“During the international intervention in the Congo …, newcomers 
were socialized in the culture of their organization through long 
formal training (for diplomats) or a short induction course (for 
MONUC staff) and through everyday interactions with other staff 
members. Diplomats and UN officials moved from headquarters to 
the field or from one field mission to the next every couple of years. 
They brought to their new position the knowledge they acquired in 
previous postings – and many approached the Congo exactly as if it 
was their previous country of deployment. [UN staff] found (or 
privileged) information indicating that violence in the east was a 
top-down problem. The UN Secretary General reports on the Congo 
emphasized mostly the national and regional roots of violence.” 
(2008:15) 
 
This is not to suggest that local and country-specific knowledge is not 
considered important. Rather, it is to suggest that the relevance of 
country-specific knowledge is always relative to the pre-defined uni-
                                                 
3  A long-time Sudanese employee of UNDP in the Sudan once noted that despite her hav-
ing a university degree, much younger colleagues not from Sudan would almost always 
assume positions higher up in the hierarchy after a relatively short period of time. See also 
the discussion about this in Autesserre (2008), and Call and Cousens 2007.  
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versal principles that stipulate the goals of peacebuilding: Knowledge 
about the particular geographical, social, economic, political charac-
teristics of a country are considered important as a means to the end of 
fine-tuning and adjusting, on the margins, how to implement a pre-
defined liberal peacebuilding model. The Office of the High Commis-
sioner on Human Rights’ (OHCHR) “Rule-of-Law tools for post-
conflict states” states, for example,  that “Understanding how the jus-
tice sector actually worked in the State before and during the conflict, 
and how it should function if the rule of law is to take root, should be 
a central feature of any peacekeeping operation.” (2006: 1) and pro-
ceeds to describe how peacebuilders should operate to establish the 
rule of law:  
 
“…efforts to reform the justice system are doomed to failure unless 
the peacekeeping operation knows the strengths and weaknesses of 
the courts, police, prosecution and prison service, the influence 
wielded by the minister of justice over the appointment of judges, 
the root causes of corruption or the simple dysfunction of court ad-
ministration. This knowledge results from intense, ongoing observa-
tion and interaction by civilian peacekeepers whose job it is to know 
and follow the key actors in the justice sector closely.” (2006: 2).  
 
Note how the document operates on the assumption that there is a 
standard against which the actual justice system should be measured 
and how the key to success is for peacekeepers to know both 
“strengths and weaknesses”, which presumably must be defined in 
relation to a standard, and how to “work the system” in terms of fol-
lowing “the key actors in the justice sector closely.” Indeed, the 
document proceeds to assert that “Monitoring the administration of 
justice is also important as a way to test a Government’s good fait and 
intentions” and that  
 
“A government’s true commitment to upholding judicial guarantees 
can best be determined by its willingness or refusal to implement legal 
reforms when the peacekeeping operation presents it with solid, sub-
stantiated information and recommendations, and feasible responses to 
the problem.” (ibid.: 2—3).  
 
Thus conceived the liberal peacebuilding model certainly operates 
with a given standard for how society is to be organized and governed 
in that failure to agree with or take on board the “substantiated infor-
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mation and recommendations” of peacebuilders is seen as lack of po-
litical will.  
 
In a report on transitional justice, the UN Secretary General similarly 
notes, in a language reminiscent of the description of the knowledge 
and skill demanded by colonial administrators (Cohn 1996), how pre-
defined templates and universal knowledge-claims are to be adjusted 
in light of the local circumstances, and where a cadre of skilled ex-
perts is considered critical to the success of effective governing:  
 
“Through the years, specialized United Nations staff have acquired 
significant expertise and experience in assisting post-conflict countries 
to establish transitional justice processes, restore shattered justice sys-
tems and rebuild the rule of law. Given the large (and growing) de-
mand in this area, however, their numbers are not adequate for the 
task at hand. As such, we are increasingly drawing on external exper-
tise to supplement the work of our expert staff. However, finding and 
deploying such personnel expeditiously presents a number of difficul-
ties. … What is required is a mix of expertise that includes knowledge 
of United Nations norms and standards for the administration of jus-
tice, experience in post-conflict settings, an understanding of the host 
country’s legal system (inter alia, common law, civil law, Islamic 
law), familiarity with the host-country culture, an approach that is in-
clusive of local counterparts, an ability to work in the language of the 
host country and familiarity with a variety of legal areas. (UN 2004: 
para 60-61) 
 
As a final illustration of the hierarchy between general and local 
knowledge, consider a report produced by the Peacebuilding Support 
Office (PBSO). The PBSO is presumably the place in the UN system 
where lessons about how to improve and organize peacebuilding ef-
forts are to be crystallized and disseminated. The PBSO summarizes 
its workshop by noting that “One of the main conclusions to emerge 
from the Working Group’s review … is that each case is unique. 
There are no universal lessons and no ready-made, “one-size-fits-all 
models.” It continues, however, to emphasize that  
 
“…there are certain normative frameworks, such as the Guiding Prin-
ciples for Internal Displacement, or the Security Council Resolution 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security which enjoy widespread accep-
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tance. In addition, there are general principles and operational guide-
lines across countries and sectoral areas that have broader relevance 
and applicability. The challenge, therefore, lies in calibrating general 
principles with country-specific realities based on an accurate analy-
sis of commonalities and differences among countries.” (UN, PBSO 
2008: 4. Emphasis added) 
 
Here, the recognition of having to avoid universalist templates still 
operates from inside an understanding of peacebuilding as being to 
calibrate and adapt non-negotiable general principles to knowledge of 
country-specific realities. The frame of reference for what is to be 
done is defined by the universal liberal project from which liberal 
peacebuilding draws its content and legitimacy. It is, moreover, the 
peacebuilding expert that is to “calibrate” the model to fit with “coun-
try-specific realities” based on his or her analysis of “commonalities 
and differences” between countries.  
 
The hierarchical relationship between the universal and the local de-
scribed above is also expressed in how peacebuilders interact with 
their local counterparts at the country level. UN staff in Liberia inter-
viewed for this project typically described their relation with their Li-
berian counterparts in terms not only of the UN having capacity and 
the Government of Liberia having no or little capacity, but also in 
terms of an un-spoken assumption that the UN knows what is impor-
tant to do to build a liberal peace. Asked about the involvement of 
UNMIL in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) – 
a document that is to be produced and “owned” by the government – 
an UNMIL civil affairs officer specializing in peacebuilding said that 
one of his roles was to “ensure that the PRS was conflict sensitive”. 
He noted that 
 
“…there is a tendency on the part of post-conflict governments, be-
cause of urgent needs to rebuild, to forget or overlook critical needs 
regarding post-conflict issues. We sat down identified critical conflict 
factors in Liberia.4 
 
The PRS process was organized around different working groups, 
with representatives from different parts of the government and from 
the UN and other donors. When asked whether it was the government 
                                                 
4 Interview, UNMIL Civil Affairs Officer, May 22, 2008. All interviews – totalling 15 in 
UNHCR, UNDP and UNMIL - were conducted by the author in Monrovia, Liberia, May, 
2008. Interviews were semi-structured and conducted with a tape recorder. 
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that took the initiative to establish a working group on peacebuilding 
and conflict sensitivity, he responded:  
 
“No, no, it came from us. Then the government saw the need. Then 
we had series of meetings. … We developed several papers on con-
flict sensitivity for each of the four pillars of the PRS. … It was the 
UN that took the lead in drafting the 10 pager. We said: “These are 
the issues you need to address”. We took lead. Quite frankly we really 
did not only have a say. Government lacks capacity on conflict sensi-
tivity and peacebuilding.”  
 
When asked about the specific techniques or modes of operating to 
seek to influence government counterparts, all of those interviewed 
emphasized how the UN had access to and knowledge of global best 
practices from which the government could draw. They described in 
detail how they would sit down with government official and try to 
explain to them how things work and what would be an appropriate 
policy response to a particular problem. Another UNMIL official de-
scribed his position in the following terms:  
 
“We have lot of influence. In fact, Rule of Law section is supposed to 
act as coordinator of different activities being undertaken. So that you 
have a sense of who is doing what where. Then we identify gaps and 
tell actors where there are gaps.”5  
 
When asked more specifically about how they go about their job, how 
they operate, how things get done, a particular view of the relevance 
of knowledge of the local context typically emerged. A senior rule of 
law official in UNMIL described, as an example, how other actors 
would come to him to ask for advice about how to proceed vis a vis 
the national government:  
 
People would come here to get information. When they come in – 
when they do work within justice area – they come and you tell them 
how to handle the ministry. If there are people in there that get things 
done. Or, in the case of the judiciary, the chief justice is a very diffi-
cult man if you don’t handle him in this or that way. You have to un-
derstand his history and background.6  
                                                 
5 UNMIL Rule of Law Specialist, Interview May 20, 2008. 
6 UNMIL Rule of Law Specialist, Interview May 23, 2008. 
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Similarly, an UNMIL political affairs officer provided the following 
description of how he operated:  
 
You ask a lot of people. Civ Affairs in UNMIL, people in the minis-
tries, you talk a lot before you do anything. That’s the best approach. 
Asking people in the ministries. Who’s got what knowledge. What’s 
discussed already in the cabinet. It’s 101 political affairs. Networking. 
In my position you have to know who’s got knowledge. I have to 
know who would object if they were not included. You gotta tap into 
what people know.7  
 
Some times, such views of how to “work the system” – how to lobby 
government officials to advance pre-defined peacebuilding goals – 
were linked directly to the identity of the UN as a non-political or-
ganization respecting state sovereignty. That is: by placing themselves 
in a position of being bearers of, and experts in how to implement 
“principles true in every country” (Mitchell 2002), the knowledge that 
was deemed relevant about local factors had almost exclusively to do 
with how to approach more or less recalcitrant or “difficult” institu-
tions and individuals in Liberia. This tendency to privilege policy re-
sponses built around a specific type of, western-based, universal 
knowledge is intimately related to what Hughes and Pupavic (2005) 
have called the “pathologisation” of fragile states and post-conflict 
societies: peacebuilders tend to define post-conflict countries as trau-
matized, dysfunctional, irrational, immature, which legitimizes a turn 
towards models and solutions defined by outsiders rather than local 
actors.  
 
                                                 
7 UNMIL Political Affairs Officer, Interview May 21, 2008. 
International legitimacy trumps do-
mestic legitimacy 
Peacebuilders increasingly recognize the importance of focusing on 
questions of legitimacy, both in terms of how external actors are per-
ceived by the local population, and in terms of how the general popu-
lation in a country understand and perceives of the state that is to be 
built to prevent future conflicts (OECD-DAC 2008). Indeed, one of 
the most important criteria for judging whether peacebuilding efforts 
will succeed is the extent to which different local groups see the state 
as legitimate. But while the legitimacy of the state is increasingly rec-
ognized as central for success, how this issue is approached by the UN 
and other external actors is another matter. As noted above, peace-
building is defined in terms of advancing a set of liberal principles to 
be built into the new state that is to emerge throughout an extended 
peacebuilding effort. Because the content of these principles are non-
negotiable and self-evident, however, there is little discussion about 
and negotiation over what, precisely, these principles should entail in 
a specific setting. This is because the ends and means of peacebuilding 
are considered legitimate by virtue of being in conformity internation-
ally established norms and principles, leaving the question of how dif-
ferent domestic groups perceive of the state as a question of less im-
portance. In essence, peacebuilders tend to assume that the interna-
tionally established legitimacy of the liberal principles that they ad-
vance will automatically translate into domestic legitimacy of the state 
as viewed by the local population. While the normative pull of liberal 
principles are  unmistakable, it is an open question whether different 
domestic groups see such principles as legitimate – especially when 
these are effectively being imposed from the outside rather than being 
developed through negotiations and debate domestically.8 
 
In the new Capstone doctrine for UN “multidimensional” peacekeep-
ing operations – including peacebuilding efforts – the discussion of 
the normative framework that legitimizes peacekeeping is noteworthy 
in several respects. It is asserted that  
 
“International human rights law is an integral part of the normative 
framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Univer-
                                                 
8 For an excellent discussion how liberal principles such as those that define peacebuilding 
can or should be imposed as a set of given and non-negotiable principles or whether they 
should be allowed to emerge, over time, through an extended process of domestic debate, 
criticism and contestation, see Bilgrami (2006).  
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sal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets the cornerstone of  inter-
national human rights standards, emphasizes that human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody.” 
(UN 2008a: 14).  
 
In the document, human rights are discussed as one of four central 
sources defining the normative framework for UN peacebuilding, the 
other three being the Charter of the UN, International humanitarian 
law and Security Council mandate. Ownership is defined as a success-
factor linked to establishing good or positive perceptions of the peace 
operation among the local population. The document asserts that “Ef-
fective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce 
the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate imple-
mentation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national 
capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.” (ibid: 
39). 
 
“The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to suc-
ceed, United Nations peacekeeping operations must also be perceived 
as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local popula-
tion. The United Nations recent experience with multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping has also served to highlight the need for United Nations 
peacekeeping operations to promote national and local ownership, in 
order to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace.”  (Ibid.: 
36). 
 
As it moves on to discuss the general question of peacekeeping opera-
tions’ legitimacy, the doctrine exhibits a clear tendency to view local 
perceptions as potential misperceptions. “International legitimacy” it 
is asserted, “is one of the most important assets of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation.” (p.36). This is explained as stemming from 
UNSC mandate, the broad composition of troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) and from the authority vested in the Secretary-General of the 
UN. It is acknowledged, however, that this legitimacy also hinges on 
the quality of the conduct of peacekeepers. Indeed, the doctrine refers 
three times in a few paragraphs to how the “perceived legitimacy” of 
peacekeeping is affected by the quality of the conduct of peacekeep-
ers. Here, “effective approaches to national and local ownership” is 
seen as important to “reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the opera-
tion and support mandate implementation.” (ibid. 39).  
 
To talk about the perceived legitimacy of a UN peacekeeping opera-
tion, however, is to assume that their actual legitimacy does not de-
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pend on the views of the local population. Indeed, it is to assume that 
the international (liberal) standards that peace operations, and peace-
building efforts, adhere to are what really provides them with legiti-
macy. This amounts to invoking a normative definition of legitimacy 
where legitimacy is linked to general concepts of right and good (i.e. 
human rights), and it is thus possible that some actors “perceive” of 
this legitimacy in the wrong way – that they have misperceptions 
about what is and what is not legitimate in a normative sense. It thus 
makes sense to talk about the “perceived legitimacy” of UN peace op-
erations at the local level and to juxtapose that to the international le-
gitimacy that peace operations have. In an empirical reading of le-
gitimacy, by contrast – one following from Weber’s discussion of the 
matter – to talk about “perceived legitimacy” is nonsensical since le-
gitimacy is, by definition, established and maintained through the per-
ceptions, or beliefs, people may have regardless of their normative 
content (Bellina et al 2009).  
 
The emphasis on international over domestic legitimacy is perhaps 
best expressed in how local ownership is conceptualized in the Cap-
strone Doctrine: Whereas human rights are seen as defining for the 
normative order of peace operations together with the UN charter, 
UNSC mandate and international humanitarian law, ownership is in-
cluded as “other success factors” that are derived from experience. In 
short, local ownership is not seen as part of the legitimacy of peace 
operations. In much the same way as in the Secretary General’s report 
on Rule of Law in post-conflict settings, the Capstone doctrine brings 
out the extent to which the principle of ownership is not foundational 
but is (merely) a measure to increase effectiveness. It is a principle 
that emerges from the outside to constrain peacebuilding operations, 
as it were, not a principle that defines what peacebuilding is from the 
inside in terms of its goals and mode of operations. This is eminently 
understandable against the backdrop of the universalist, Archimedean 
interpretation of the liberal principles that define peacebuilding, where 
the end-state is given from outside rather than inside the social.  
 
One of the more striking aspects of contemporary peacebuilding ef-
forts is that whereas rule of law principles are defined as the very cor-
nerstone of what a well-functioning state should look like, these rule 
of law principles are not applied to the UN itself. That is: at the same 
time as the UN is deeply involved in defining what laws should look 
like, how institutions should be set up and function, what should be 
prioritized etc, the local population whose lives are affected by UN 
decisions do not have access to the type of review and contestation 
that fall within administrative law-mechanisms of accountability at the 
national level in liberal democracies. Such principles includes the i) 
procedural participation and transparency, i.e. the right of affected in-
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dividuals to receive relevant information and to have their opinions 
heard; ii) reasoned decisions, i.e. that decisions are justified and open 
to contestation; and iii) review – the right to challenge decisions made 
by administrative bodies in court or another form of independent re-
view.  
 
For the military side of UN peacekeeping operations, there are Rules 
of Engagement (RoE), but for the civilian aspect of a UN peacekeep-
ing operations, as well as for, say, the UNDP, there are no rules with 
legal standing that secures – as far as I have been able to document – 
such rights for the local population. A recent review of the account-
ability of IOs by one international law scholar concludes in this regard 
that whereas bureaucracies in the national context are embedded in a 
rule of law context, IOs are not:  
 
“A turn to the domestic context for inspiration also draws attention to 
the institutional context in which autonomous bureaucracies are em-
bedded, namely the context of a rule-of-law. A functionally equivalent 
context is blatantly missing at the international level. An elementary 
function that the national context of a rule-of-law provides is the insti-
tutional framework for contesting the actions of bureaucracies – their 
decisions and interpretations – both in legal and political fora. This 
makes autonomous bureaucracies bearable. It is more fundamentally a 
prerequisite for their desirability and a necessary ingredient for indi-
vidual and collective democratic self-determination” (Venzke 2008: 
1422-1423). 
 
This feature of the UN’s mode of operations is in part explained by 
the fact that the UN and other external actors are there to assist na-
tional governments, who ultimately are “owners” of and responsible 
for what goes on through the principle of sovereignty. To the extent 
that there should be such accountability mechanisms, then, it should 
be organized through national governments. As David Chandler 
(2006) has noted, however, external actors’ role in peace- and state-
building efforts amounts to an “empire in denial” where their vast 
powers are concealed by their insistence that they are merely advising 
and facilitating, that it is the national government that “owns” the 
policies and actions undertaken to re-build society. Moreover, there is 
no reason why the UN could not establish some form of accountability 
and review mechanisms, as the World Bank has already done through 
its Independent Inspection Panel.9 While DPKO has guidelines and 
                                                 
9 The Independent Inspection Panel is to make sure that the Bank adheres to its own proce-
dural rules in assessing the impact of particular projects on local populations. Citizens can 
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best practices for how to engage with the local population, how to 
consult with political leaders and to secure “ownership”, there are no 
rules or institutionalized mechanisms that bestows any rights to the 
local population to hold the UN accountable. This lack of accountabil-
ity mechanisms reflects, I argue, the built-in assumption that peace-
building is about advancing allegedly universally agreed upon princi-
ples. Because peacebuilders are seen to advance the “right” objectives, 
and know how to do it, there is no need for elaborate checks and bal-
ances, for review and for accountability, of how they go about effort 
to reform a society’s core institutions. 
 
When coupled with the assumption that international legitimacy trans-
lates into de facto domestic legitimacy, it is not surprising that peace-
building efforts are rarely based on solid local ownership. As one 
study argues: 
 
“In practice.., local ownership in peacebuilding contexts has come to 
be less about respecting local autonomy and more about insisting 
that domestic political structures take responsibility for – ownership 
over – the implementation of a pre-existing (and externally-defined) 
set of policy prescriptions.” (Donais 2008: 7) 
 
Current peacebuilding practice tends to interpret ownership in a nomi-
nal, technocratic way, aimed at transferring responsibility of exter-
nally defined reforms to local authorities, yet leaving little room for 
genuine dialogue, experimentation and innovation to establish custom-
size approaches. “Far from restoring autonomy to local societies”, 
therefore, the approach to ownership “can be viewed as a fundamen-
tally disempowering form of local ownership, with internal political 
forces expected to both uncritically adopt and actively implement ex-
ternal blueprints for post-conflict transformation (ibid).  
This impulse to do rather than support, to define plans and to tell gov-
ernment officials what they should do in order to build a peaceful, lib-
eral democratic state is intimately linked to two standard phrases 
found in the discourse on peacebuilding and state failure. Societies 
emerging from conflict are seen to “lack capacity” to govern effec-
tively, which justifies a more hands-on approach on the part of exter-
nal actors to get things done. Some groups in post-conflict societies, 
including the government, are also seen to sometime “lack political 
will” in the sense of not being on-board with the goals contained in 
the liberal peacebuilding model. The categorization of post-conflict 
societies, and sub-groups within them, as lacking capacity and/or po-
litical will only makes sense, however, within a framework where the 
                                                 
submit complaints to the Panel only concerning the procedures used, not the content of 
the decision as such. 
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goals and specific reform efforts are primarily defined by outsiders. 
Even in cases where the government is generally seen to have a strong 
pro-western and liberal agenda – as in the case of the Ellen Shirleaf 
Johnson’s Government in Liberia – “lack of political will” is often 
invoked as the central reason why it is difficult to succeed in imple-
menting the stated goals of a UN peaceoperation. At a retreat for the 
UN Country Team and UNMIL senior management in 2008, for ex-
ample, the participants identified lack of “capacity and will” of both 
civil society and the Government of Liberia as among the central ob-
stacles to be addressed in order to “improve the impact of the UN”. 
(UN 2008b: 2). While the frustration about lack of capacity for efforts 
to re-build a society emerging from conflict is understandable, it is 
doubtful whether understanding, and acting on, post-conflict societies 
in terms of lack of capacity and lack of political will is conducive to 
fostering local ownership and generating “bottom-up” legitimacy for a 
liberal democratic political and institutional arrangement.  
Conclusion  
The two assumptions about the superiority of universal knowledge 
and of international legitimacy underpin the rationale and organization 
of peacebuilding efforts, and they help explain why respect for local 
ownership and sensitivity to local conditions is so difficult to imple-
ment in practice. In this framework, universal templates are privi-
leged, external actors assume the position of experts, and legitimacy is 
believed to follow from the assumed normative force and universal 
acceptance of the international standards that underpin peacebuilding.  
 
The problem, then, is written into the very rationale and definition of 
what peacebuilding has come to mean, in terms of advancing and im-
plementing a set of a priori defined principles for the organization and 
governing of society. But adjusting the ends and means of peacebuild-
ing to make it fit in with the local context and the “political will” of 
key local groups involves some very difficult normative considera-
tions, not least in terms of how to adjudicate between different and 
possibly conflicting ends and values. Should democratic elections be 
put on hold until a robust institutional framework is in place, as many 
authors have suggested (Paris 2004)? Or should a trusteeship ar-
rangement be used, where sovereignty is transferred back to the coun-
try in question only after an extended period of tutelage and training 
(Krasner 2005)? Alternatively, should one seek to foster ownership by 
building on local institutions even when doing so means supporting 
illiberal forms of rule?  
 
These are all difficult ethical and political questions that are far be-
yond the scope of this report and I limit myself to noting that public-
political debate and reflection about how and whether liberal princi-
ples should always and a priori define the goals of peacebuilding ef-
forts is of central importance. There is a strong argument to be made 
that only when external actors allow for liberal principles to emerge 
from and through domestic debate and contestation – rather than being 
already defined by external actors – will peacebuilding efforts be sus-
tainable and “owned” by the population in question. Here, there is 
considerable inspiration to be taken from Akeel Bilgrami’s discussion 
of how liberal principles can also be understood in non-Archimedean 
and a priori universalistic terms. Discussing the case of securalism in 
India, Bilgrami argues that what was problematical with Nehru’s 
stance vis a vis Muslims and Sikhs was not that it was secular, but that 
it was a priori secular, refusing any involvement of Muslims and 
Sikhs as religious groups because Nehru’s Congress Party – as a self-
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proclaimed secular party – claimed to represent both religious and 
non-religious groups. Bilgrami summarizes his charge thus:  
 
For three decades before independence the Congress under Nehru re-
fused to let a secular policy emerge through negotiation between dif-
ferent communal interests, by denying at every step in the various 
conferrings with the British, Jinnah's demand that the Muslim League 
represents the Muslims, a Sikh leader represents the Sikhs, and a hari-
jan leader represents the untouchable community. And, the ground for 
the denial was simply that as a secular party they could not accept that 
they not represent all these communities. Secularism thus never got 
the chance to emerge out of a creative dialogue between these differ-
ent communities. It was sui generis. This archimedean existence gave 
secularism procedural priority but in doing so it gave it no abiding 
substantive authority. (Bilgrami 1994: 1754. Emphasis added). 
 
The key phrase here is “no abiding substantive authority”: because it 
was defined unilaterally and prior to public-political debate, secular 
principles never got the chance to be seen as substantively authorita-
tive (“owned”) by Sikhs and Muslims. The parallel to contemporary 
efforts to have different domestic groups “own” policies, institutions 
and principles that have been defined by others is striking. A more 
pluralist reading of liberal principles would insist on placing the pro-
cedural principle of participation, debate and contestation on a more 
equal footing with the substantive principles of the liberal peacebuild-
ing model.  
 
At a more practical level and organizational level we can identify 
some elements that can at least alleviate some of the problems identi-
fied above. Based on the analysis above, the problem with peacebuild-
ing is that there is too much emphasis on building – on the idea that 
the peace is there to be built by outsiders and their expertise rather 
than assisted, cultivated, facilitated and mediated. If peacebuilding 
had more to do with facilitation, mediation and conflict resolution, it 
would arguably take the edge off the arrogance of peacebuilding, and 
would help peacebuilders see the problem in a more nuanced and con-
text specific way. Peacebuilders will arguably help secure local own-
ership in a more effective way if they are trained to always work with 
local counterparts rather than on them, and to build new institutions on 
the basis of what can be plausibly agreed upon by different local ac-
tors. Institutionalizing the ideal of the peacebuilder as a facilitator 
rather than a builder, then, could possibly be a step in the right direc-
tion.  
 
In the current institutional set-up at the UN, however, both country 
specific knowledge and good offices functions, such as diplomatic ne-
gotiations and facilitation, is the purview of the Department of Politi-
cal Affairs (DPA). Often, the working relationship between DPA and 
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DPKO are suboptimal, owing to classic turf-battles for resources, 
competence and decision-making authority. The difficult relationship 
between these two organizational units is not readily resolved, given 
the complex political nature of UN reform efforts. But there are other 
ways to institutionalize the ideal of the facilitator within the central 
organizations involved in peacebuilding: the development of best 
practices and operational guidelines within key organizations, includ-
ing the DPKO and UNDP are cases in point. Moreover, the develop-
ment and institutionalization of specific training modules aimed at in-
stilling skills and knowledge of facilitation, mediation and conflict 
resolution at all levels of operations will help take the edge off the 
technocratic building ideal of existing peacebuilding efforts. 
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